ABSTRACT To ensure the integrity of cloud storage, it is necessary for data owners to launch data integrity auditing (DIA) periodically. To fit more application scenarios, the research direction is shifted to design identity-based DIA (ID-DIA) protocols without expensive public key infrastructure, which can resist the quantum computing attacks simultaneously. However, the existing ID-DIA protocols are usually based on heavy anti-quantum computing cryptographies, which might severely limit their practical deployments. To address this problem, we explore three ways to design RLWE-based ID-DIA (ID-DIA-RLWE) protocols. The first is to improve the existing LWE-based ID-DIA protocols. The second is to enhance the existing RLWE-based DIA protocols. The third is to instantiate the proposed semantic ID-DIA protocol. Among these three proposed protocols, the third one is the most efficient due to its simplest construction. We also propose a new security model of ID-DIA protocols, including correctness assurance, security guarantee, and privacy protection. Then, we provide theoretical analysis of all proposed ID-DIA protocols under the given security model. Finally, we conduct extensive performance evaluation and comparison, which further validate that the third protocol has superiority in the perspectives of computation, communication, and storage costs.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of cloud computing, cloud storage becomes more and more common, which allows data owners to outsource their abundant data to the cloud so that local storage burden is hugely relieved [1] , [2] . However, cloud storage also brings plenty of security challenges, such as hardware/software faults, operational errors, malicious attacks, etc [3] . Although cloud service providers (CSP) might try their best to address these security challenges, data loss is still inevitable [4] . Faced with data loss incidents, CSPs might be dishonest with their users on behalf of economic interests. As a result, data owners have to verify the integrity of their outsourced data periodically.
To this end, it is intuitive for data owners to download the whole data from the cloud, which however is far from
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Muhamamd Aleem. practicality due to its inefficiency. To address this problem, Ateniese et al. [5] initially utilized the RSA cryptographic primitive [6] to design a data integrity auditing (DIA) protocol, which allows data owners to verify data integrity using small-size proofs from the cloud. Because of its simplicity and efficiency, many DIA protocols were proposed following this breakthrough work [5] . These following works focused mainly on two perspectives. One is to improve the operating efficiency of data integrity auditing, such as protocol [7] based on Fermat's little theorem [8] , protocol [9] based on discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [10] , etc. The other is to extend the functionality of DIA protocols, such as third-party public auditing [12] , batch auditing [13] , supporting data dynamics [14] , key-exposure resilient [15] , etc. As a result, a desirable DIA protocol should be light-weight and extensible in addition to the basic data auditing functionality. However, most of the existing DIA protocols depend on public key infrastructure (PKI) [16] to manage all cloud users' keys, making PKI be the performance bottleneck. To relieve the burden of PKI, an alternative way is to employ identity-based cryptographic primitives [17] in the DIA protocols. Up to now, several ID-based DIA (ID-DIA) protocols were presented based on ID-based aggregate signatures, such as [18] - [21] . These ID-DIA protocols usually allow third party auditors knowing user identities to handle data integrity auditing, which can fit more application scenarios.
It is well-known that the classic cryptographic primitives cannot thwart the quantum computing attacks, such as RSA and DLP [22] . This means that a majority of existing DIA protocols become no longer secure in the quantum computing era. To meet this challenge, it is intuitive to utilize anti-quantum computing cryptographies to design DIA protocols. Lattice cryptography is widely accepted to be anti-quantum computing [23] , and thus becomes the prior choice to design DIA protocols that can resist quantum computing attacks, such as [24] - [28] . Among them, Liu et al. ' s protocol [27] is the only ID-DIA protocol. However, protocol [27] based on learn with errors (LWE) involves large amounts of matrix operations, making its workload high. In addition, protocol [27] is unable to allow data owners to reconstruct their own data from cloud proofs, which might bring security risks. The reason is that the malicious cloud may provide the false data for data owners to download. Thereafter, it is necessary to further study the design of ID-DIA protocols that can thwart quantum computing attacks.
In this paper, we first formalize a new security model of ID-DIA protocols. Then, we design ID-DIA protocols based on ring learning with error (RLWE), which a lattice cryptographic primitive enjoying worst-case hardness assumption [23] . The key contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We design two RLWE-based ID-DIA (ID-DIA-RLWE) protocols from the existing DIA protocols. The first is to improve the existing LWE-based ID-DIA protocol from the security and efficiency. The second is to enhance the existing RLWE-based DIA protocol from the functionality.
• We propose a semantic ID-DIA protocol, which provides a generic way to design secure ID-DIA protocols. Furthermore, we present a new ID-DIA-RLWE protocol by instantiating the semantic ID-DIA protocol, which is the most efficient due to its simplest construction.
• We present a new security model of ID-DIA protocols, which describes the security challenges more precisely. The key ideas include: 1) protecting data owners from cloud cheating behaviors; 2) enabling data owners to recover their data from cloud proofs; 3) hiding user data from the curious TPA.
• We provide theoretical analysis of all proposed ID-DIA-RLWE protocols from the perspectives of correctness and security, including three concrete protocols and one abstract protocol.
• We conduct extensive performance evaluation and comparison of all lattice-based ID-DIA protocols in this paper. The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II describes mathematic notations and background knowledge. Section III first introduces system model of ID-DIA protocols, and then describes the security model. Section IV shows how to design an ID-DIA-RLWE protocol from the previous LWE-based ID-DIA protocol. Section V transforms the previous ID-DIA protocol into an ID-DIA-RLWE protocol. Section VI designs a semantic ID-DIA-RLWE protocol. Section VII presents a new ID-DIA-RLWE protocol using the semantic protocol in Section VI. Section VIII conducts the performance evaluation and comparison of all lattice-based ID-DIA protocols. Section IX provides the conclusion of our work.
II. PRELIMINARY
In this section, we first describe mathematical notations, and then introduce background knowledge of lattice-based cryptographies.
A. MATHEMATICAL NOTATIONS
In this paper, vectors and matrices are usually described by boldface symbols, and a single element is usually represented by regular letters. Let Z q denote a set {0, 1, . . . , q}, Z n×m q denote a set of n × m matrices whose elements are in Z q . Denote x ← U y as a sample x from y following uniformly random distribution, x · y as the element-wise multiplication between x and y.
Let T ID denote a random pertmutation function indexed by ID, which can be expressed as
where
n and H (·) is a secure hash function.
Let R = Z[x]/(x n + 1) denote a ring, whose elements are the coefficients of integer polynomials with the degree less than n. Then, R q = R/qR is denoted as a ring whose elements are computed by performing modulo q on the polynomial coefficients in R. In addition, R m×n q represents the set of m × n matrices whose elements are in R q .
Let denote a lattice, and x ← D ,c,σ denote a sample x from following discrete Gaussian distribution with the center c and the variance σ . Note that c = 0 and σ = 1 if they are not specified.
B. LEARNING WITH ERRORS
We focus mainly on the definition of LWE and RLWE hardness assumptions, including search and decision versions. Both of them can hardly be solved using quantum computers [23] . Note that without the help of T A , it is almost impossible to solve b ← D u q (A),σ from Ab = α, since it is just a small integer solution (SIS) problem whose hardness can be reduced to the LWE problem [31] . Next, we describe the discrete gaussian sampling related with the RLWE problem.
Theorem 4: There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm RLWETrapGen(n, q) [19] generating A ∈ R n q and its basis T A ∈ R k q , where n = k + 2. A classic implementation is reviewed in Algorithm 1 [28] , [32] , [33] .
Algorithm 1 RLWETrapGen
Input: k, q. Output: a vector A and its trapdoor T A .
1: choosing a random a ∈ R q ; 2:
Theorem 5: There is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm RLWESamplePre(A, T A , α, s) [19] generating b ∈ R 1×n q that satisfies Ab = α, where A ∈ R n q and T A ∈ R n q are the outputs of RLWETrapGen,
, and s is relatively small. Note that without the knowledge of T A , it is hard to calculate b ← D R q from Ab = α, since it is just a ring SIS problem whose hardness can be reduced to the RLWE problem [23] .
III. ID-BASED DATA INTEGRITY AUDITING PROTOCOL
This section first introduces the system model of ID-DIA protocols, and then describes the security model.
A. SYSTEM MODEL ID-DIA protocols usually consist of four entities, which are depicted in Fig. 1 . The details are as follows. 1) Data owners have a number of data to be stored, which however have limited local resources. Thus, they intend to store their data on the cloud; 2) Cloud server has massive resources, which actually stores the outsourced data of its users; 3) Third party auditor (TPA) has expertise in data integrity auditing, which is neutral and objective; 4) Key distribution center (KGC) generates and issues system keys for the above three entities. In this paper, we utilize these four entities to design ID-DIA protocols. Our proposed protocols contain six parts, i.e., ID-DIA = (Setup, Extract, OutGen, Challenge, ProofGen, ProofCheck), which is the same as previous ID-DIA protocols. The abstract description of ID-DIA framework is as follows.
• Setup(λ) → (msk, pk): Given a security parameter λ, the KGC outputs master secret key msk and public key pk.
• Extract(msk, ID; pk)→ sk ID : Given the master secret key msk and user identity ID, the KGC outputs the corresponding secret key sk ID .
• • Challenge(λ, ID) → γ : Given the security parameter λ and the user identity ID, the TPA outputs a challenge sequence γ that is utilized to audit the data integrity of the client U ID .
• ProofGen(γ , ID, O ID ; pk)→ : Given the challenge sequence γ , the challenged user identity ID and its outsourced data O ID , the cloud outputs a data possession proof .
• ProofCheck(γ , ; sk ID , pk)→ ζ : Given the challenge sequence γ and the data possession proof , the TPA outputs the integrity verification result ζ indicating whether the cloud storage is intact.
B. SECURITY MODEL
The previous works usually formalize their security models from two aspects, i.e., security guarantee against the malicious cloud and privacy protection against the curious TPA [19] , [27] . However, this is not strong enough to capture the security requirements for practical application. The reason is that cloud users cannot directly download its data from the dishonest cloud. Thus, the client should have the ability to recover its data from the valid cloud proofs. Based on the above discussion, our new security model is presented as follows. 1) Security guarantee: On one hand, user data on the cloud is faced with serious inner and external security challenges. Thus, it is likely that the cloud loses its user data sometimes. However, the cloud might determine to cover up its data abnormality for business reputation and benefit. On the other hand, the TPA has the responsibility to check the integrity of cloud storage. Thus, there is an inevitable security game between the cloud and the TPA, which is denoted as SG. In the SG, the challenger behaves as the client and the TPA, and the adversary plays the role of the cloud that intends to cover up the data loss. Then, we can obtain the following framework of SG.
• Setup(λ) → (msk, pk): The challenger invokes ID-DIA.Setup to compute the master secret key msk and the public key pk. The challenger transmits pk to the adversary.
• TagQuery(ID, D ID ) → T ID : The adversary can query the tags of any user data. After receiving the identity ID and the data D ID from the adversary, the challenger invokes ID-DIA.Extract and ID-DIA.OutGen to compute the secret key sk ID and the data tag T ID . The challenger transmits T ID to the adversary.
• ProofGen(D ID , T ID ; pk)→ (γ , ): After receiving the outsourced data T ID from the challenger, the adversary first computes a challenge sequence γ , and then forges the integrity proof using replay, replace and forge attacks [28] . The adversary transmits its challenge sequence and forged proof to the challenger.
• Output(γ , ; sk ID , pk)→ ζ : After receiving the challenge sequence γ and the forged proof , the challenger invokes ProofCheck to output a boolean value ζ .
We say that an ID-DIA protocol is secure against the malicious cloud in the case of Pr[SG. 
Privacy protection: Generally, the TPA might be curious about user data on behalf of its own benefit. However, the outsourced data might be private, which should be hidden from the TPA. Thus, there is also a privacy protection game between the client and the TPA, which is denoted as PP. In the PP, the challenger behaves as the client and the cloud, and the adversary plays the role of the TPA that intends to steal user data.
• Setup(λ) → (msk, pk): This algorithm is the same as the SG.Setup.
• DataGen(ID) → O ID : Given the user identity ID, the challenger first makes some random data D ID . The challenger then invokes ID-DIA.Extract and ID-DIA.OutGen to compute the secret key sk ID and the outsourced data O ID .
• ProofQuery(O ID ; pk)→ (γ , ): The adversary can query the integrity proof of any user data. After receiving the identity ID and the challenge sequence γ from the adversary, the challenger invokes ID-DIA.ProofGen to compute the integrity proof . The challenger transmits to the adversary.
• Recover( ; pk)→ ζ : After receiving the integrity proof , the adversary reconstructs the user data D ID which is then transmitted to the challenger. 
IV. IMPROVING ID-DIA PROTOCOLS BASED ON LWE
This section introduces how to build ID-DIA-RLWE protocols from LWE-based ID-DIA protocols, which is denoted as ID-DIA-RLWE-1 in order to differentiate the other proposed ID-DIA-RLWE protocols. Liu et al. [27] presented an ID-DIA protocols based on LWE, which is denoted as ID-DIA-LWE in this paper. Compared with RLWE, LWE has high storage, communication and computation costs [23] .
For the improvement of performance, we utilize RLWE instead of LWE in the design of ID-DIA protocols. With this thought in mind, we first review the ID-DIA-LWE protocol in [27] , and then design an improved ID-DIA protocol based on RLWE.
A. THE REVIEW OF ID-DIA-LWE PROTOCOL
The ID-DIA-LWE protocol in [27] is reviewed as follows.
• Setup(λ) → (msk, pk): Given the security parameter λ, the KGC first determines three integers m, n and q, where q ≥ poly(n)ω(log n) is a prime, and m ≥ 2nlog q. The KGC then runs LWETrapGen(n, m, q) to generate a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and its trapdoor T A ∈ Z m×m q . The KGC also generates four secure hash functions:
In addition, the cloud setups a matrix C ∈ Z n×m q and its trapdoor T m×m C using LWETrapGen(n, m, q). Then, the public key is pk = (A, C, H , H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , m, n, q) and the master secret key is msk = T A .
• Extract(msk, ID; pk)→ sk ID : Given the master secret key msk and a user identity ID, the KGC chooses an invertible matrix R = H (ID) ∈ Z m×m q at random. The KGC invokes LWEBasisDel(A, R, T A , s) to compute a matrix B = AR −1 and its trapdoor T ID , where s is the Gaussian sampling parameter. Then, the user secret key is sk ID = T ID , which is transmitted to the client U ID .
•
• Challenge(λ, ID) → γ : The TPA computes a challenge sequence γ = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i η ; κ; ID}, where κ is utilized to determine the hash function H κ (·) from any hash family.
• ProofGen(γ , O ID ; pk)→ : Once receiving the challenge sequence γ , the cloud computes µ = 
q is a random vector and ξ = LWESamplePre(C, T C , w, σ ). The cloud then obtains its integrity proof as = (µ, ν, w, ID).
• ProofCheck(γ , ; sk ID , pk)→ ζ : After receiving the cloud proof , the TPA first computes R = H (ID) and B = AR −1 . The TPA then computes S = (α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n ), where α j = H 3 (B||j). The TPA also computes µ = S η j=1 c i j H 1 (i) + Cµ − wH 2 (w) . Finally, the TPA verifies whether both Bν = µ and ν ≤ ησ √ m hold. If yes, the TPA accepts the proof; otherwise, rejects it.
B. A NEW ID-DIA-RLWE PROTCOL BASED ON ID-DIA-LWE PROTOCOL
In this subsection, we improve the above LWE-based ID-DIA protocol from the perspective of both the security and the efficiency.
From the security perspective, although the detailed proof of the ID-DIA-LWE has been shown in [27] , there is still a security challenge, i.e., cloud users without T A can hardly recover their data from the integrity proofs. This means that ID-DIA-LWE is unable to satisfy our security requirement in Definition 5. To address this problem, we require that the cloud publishes its local parameter T C to its users. From the efficiency perspective, ID-DIA-LWE involves large number of matrix operations, making its workloads high. To solve this problem, we employ RLWE instead of LWE to design ID-DIA protocols, which brings much lower workloads due to only vector operations involved.
Next, we illustrate how to design system parameters based on RLWE. First, the KGC computes T A = (v, ρ) as the master key, where v ← D R k q ,σ and ρ ← D R k q ,σ according to RLWETrapGen algorithm. The KGC determines the vector g = (2 0 , 2 1 , . . . , 2 k−1 ) as the system parameter. Second, the KGC utilizes a random pertumation function T ID (·) to compute the secret key of the user U ID as sk ID 
. Based on the above discussion, the public parameters are (k, q, g), the user secret key is T ID = (v ID , ρ ID ), and the master secret key is msk = (T A , H ).
Combining with ID-DIA-LWE, we propose ID-DIA-RLWE-1 as follows.
• Setup(λ) → (msk, pk): Given the security parameter λ, the KGC determines two integers k and q. The KGC computes
The KGC also generates a secure hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z 1×n n . In addition, the cloud setups a vector C ∈ R 1×n q and its trapdoor T C using RLWETrapGen(n, q). Thus, the public parameters are (C, T C , k, q, g) and the master secret key is msk = (T A , H ).
• Extract(msk, ID; pk)→ sk ID : Given the master secret key msk and a user identity ID, the KGC determines a random pertumation function T ID (·) using H , and then computes the user secret key as ID , 1, g 1 −(a ID ρ 1 ID +v 1 ID ) 
. . , t L ; ID) and its secret value H 1 . The client U ID publishes B and H 2 to the TPA through secure transmission channels.
• Challenge(λ, ID) → γ : This algorithm is the same as ID-DIA-LWE.Challenge, and thus is omitted here.
The cloud then obtains its integrity proof as = (µ, ν, w, ID).
• ProofCheck(γ , ; sk ID , pk)→ ζ : After receiving the cloud proof , the TPA calculates µ = η j=1 c i j H 2 (i j )+ Cµ − w and then checks whether Bν = µ holds. If no, the TPA outputs ζ = 0; otherwise, ζ = 1.
C. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF ID-DIA-RLWE-1
This subsection analyzes the performance of ID-DIA-RLWE-1 from the perspective of correctness and security.
1) CORRECTNESS
The integrity checking equation is enabled as follows:
The security against the malicious cloud is formalized in 
1) Pr[SG.Output = 1] = negl(λ).
On one hand, the cloud can obtain the system of checking equations as follows:
where i = 1, 2, . . . , L. There are L + 1 unknown variables in (2), i.e., H 2 (1), H 2 (2), . . . , H 2 (L) and B. Thus, it is almost impossible for the cloud to solve these unknown variables from (2). The same observation also holds for all other checking equations, since they can be viewed as the linear combination of (2). On the other hand, these unknown variables can also hardly be solved from user data tags, which are just RLWE problems. It is clear that the cloud can hardly forge valid integrity proofs without these unknown variables.
In addition, all of these unknown variables are λ-bits. Thus, the probability that the cloud successfully cheats the TPA is negl(λ), i.e., Pr[SG. 
where r i = H 1 (i). Thus, one can obtain Pr[Reconstruct] = 1 − negl(λ).
In summary, we can conclude a theorem as follows:
Theorem 6: The protocol ID-DIA-RLWE-1 = (Setup, Extract, OutGen, Challenge, ProofGen, ProofCheck) is secure against the malicious cloud.
3) PRIVACY PROTECTION
The privacy protection against the curious TPA is formalized in Definition 6. The TPA can obtain the system of checking equations as follows:
where i = 1, 2, . . . , L. These two equations in (3) 
V. IMPROVING DIA PROTOCOLS BASED ON RLWE
This section introduces how to build ID-DIA-RLWE protocols from RLWE-based DIA protocols, which is denoted as ID-DIA-LWE-2. Yang et al. [28] presented a DIA protocol based on RLWE, which is denoted as DIA-RLWE. Generally, DIA protocols consist of five parts: Setup, OutGen, Challenge, ProofGen, ProofCheck. The key difference between ID-based DIA protocols and DIA protocols is that users' keys are managed by whether the KGC or not. This section first reviews the DIA-RLWE protocol in [28] , and then shows how to design ID-DIA-LWE-2 based on DIA-RLWE.
A. THE REVIEW OF DIA-RLWE PROTOCOL
The DIA-RLWE protocol is reviewed as follows.
• Setup(λ) → (msk, pk): Given the security parameter λ, the user first determines two integers n and q, and r ∈ R n q , where n > 2 is the ring dimension. The user then runs RLWETrapGen(k, q) to generate a vector A ∈ Z 1×n q and its trapdoor T A , where k = n − 2. The user also generates a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z q . The user privately publishes A and (r, H ) to the cloud and the TPA, respectively. The public key is pk = (n, q) and the secret key is sk = T A .
. , d L ). The client generates the tag of d i as t i = d i · r + e i , where e i = RLWESamplePre(A, T A , H (i), s). Finally, the client U ID obtains its outsourced data
O ID = (d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d L ; t 1 , t 2 , .
. . , t L ; ID).
• ProofGen(γ , O ID ; pk)→ : Once receiving the challenge sequence γ , the cloud computes µ = • ProofCheck(γ , ; sk ID , pk)→ ζ : After receiving the cloud proof , the TPA verifies whether ν = µr + η j=1 c i j H (i j ) holds. If no, the TPA outputs ζ = 0; otherwise, ζ = 1.
B. A NEW ID-DIA-RLWE PROTCOL BASED ON DIA-RLWE PROTOCOL
In this subsection, we extend the above DIA-RLWE protocol to support ID-based data integrity auditing. The key idea is to utilize ID-DIA-RLWE-1.Extract to distribute user secret keys. The details are as follows.
The KGC also generates a secure hash functions H : {0, 1} * → Z 1×n n . Thus, the public parameters are (k, q, g) and the master secret key is msk = (T A , H ).
• Extract(msk, ID; pk)→ sk ID : This algorithm is the same as ID-DIA-RLWE-1.Extract.
• 
. . , t L ; ID), its secret value H 1 and its public key B. The client U ID publishes w and H 2 to the TPA through secure transmission channels.
• Challenge(λ, ID) → γ : This algorithm is the same as ID-DIA-RLWE1.Challenge.
• ProofGen(γ , O ID ; pk)→ : Once receiving the challenge sequence γ , the cloud computes µ = • ProofCheck(γ , ; sk ID , pk)→ ζ : After receiving the cloud proof , the TPA verifies whether ν = µw + η j=1 c i j H 2 (i j ) holds. If no, the TPA outputs ζ = 0; otherwise, ζ = 1.
C. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF ID-DIA-RLWE-2
This subsection shows the detail performance analysis of ID-DIA-RLWE-2 from the perspective of correctness and security.
1) CORRECTNESS
2) SECURITY GUARANTEE According to Definition 5, the security guarantee of ID-DIA-RLWE-2 is composed of Pr[SG.
where i = 1, 2, . . . , L. There are L + 1 unknown variables in (4), i.e., H 2 (1), H 2 (2), . . . , H 2 (L) and w. Thus, it is almost impossible for the cloud to solve these unknown variables using (4). The same observation 55738 VOLUME 7, 2019 also holds for all other checking equations, since they are just the linear combination of (4). On the other hand, these unknown variables can also hardly be solved from user data tags, which are just RLWE problems. It is clear that the cloud can hardly forge valid integrity proofs without these unknown variables. Moreover, all of these unknown variables are λ-bits. Thereafter, the probability that the cloud successfully cheats the TPA is negl(λ), i.e., Pr[SG. 
Theorem 8: The protocol ID-DIA-RLWE-2 = (Setup, Extract, OutGen, Challenge, ProofGen, ProofCheck) is secure against the malicious cloud.
3) PRIVACY PROTECTION
According to Definition 6. The TPA can obtain the system of checking equations as follows:
where i = 1, 2, . . . , L. These two equations in (5) are actually the same one. However, there are 2L unknown variables in (5), i.e., d 1 , d 2 , . . ., d L and r 1 , r 2 , . . ., r L . Thus, the TPA can hardly solve user data packets from (5). The same observation also holds for all other checking equations, since they are just the linear combination of (5). In addition, all user data packets are λ-bits, hence the probability that the TPA successfully recovers user data is negligible, i.e., Pr[PP.Output = 1] = negl(λ). We can have the following theorem. Theorem 9: The protocol ID-DIA-RLWE-2 = (Setup, Extract, OutGen, Challenge, ProofGen, ProofCheck) can protect user data privacy against the curious TPA.
VI. BUILDING AN ABSTRACT ID-DIA PROTOCOL
This section summarizes an abstract framework about how to design ID-DIA protocols, which is denoted as ID-DIA-G.
A. DESIGN RATIONAL
There are four critical points lying behind ID-DIA protocols, which are shown as follows.
1) User key distribution: The KGC is required to distribute all cloud users's secret keys. To this end, the KGC utilizes user identities to generate user secret keys. 2) Security against the malicious cloud: The TPA is required to verify the integrity of user data against the malicious cloud. To meet this requirement, cloud user U ID should compute the tags of all its data packets.
Taking any data packet d i as example, its tag is calculated as
, where i is the packet index and ϑ represents other private variables for the cloud in addition to sk ID . Moreover, the cloud integrity proof should satisfy g( , ϑ; pk) = 0. Note that: 1) packet indices are required to be embedded into data tags, otherwise different packets with the same size cannot be distinguished; 2) ϑ is required only in the case that the cloud without sk ID can still forge valid data tags; 3) the choice of f (·) and g(·) is determinated by the following principle: it is hard for the cloud to solve its unknown parameters from these two functions. In this way, the cloud without sk ID can hardly forge a valid proof to cheat its users. 3) Privacy against the curious TPA: User data is required to be hidden from the TPA. To this end, for any user U ID , its integrity proofs should contain some parameters that are confidential to the TPA, making user data hardly be reconstructed. A simple way is to adopt random masking techniques. Specifically, the outsourced data of the user U ID becomes
Note that H 1 should be kept secret by U ID . 4) User data reconstruction: It is required that cloud users can recover their own data from valid integrity proofs. To this end, the user should learn the parameters τ which are hidden from the TPA.
B. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
Following the above design rationale, our ID-DIA-G is as follows.
• Setup(λ) → (msk, pk): Given a security parameter λ, the KGC outputs master secret key msk and public parameters.
• Extract(msk, ID; pk)→ sk ID : Given the master secret key msk, the KGC utilizes user identity ID to generate the secret key sk ID of the user U ID .
and then computes its tag as
where r i = H 1 (i) and ϑ is required only in the case that the cloud without sk ID can still forge valid data tags. Finally, U ID obtains its outsourced data
. . , t L ; ID), its secret value H 1 and its public key pk. If ϑ is necessary, U ID will publish it to the TPA through secure channels.
• Challenge(λ, ID) → γ : Given the security parameter λ and the user identity ID, the TPA outputs a challenge sequence γ for auditing the data integrity of the client U ID .
• ProofGen(γ , O ID ; pk)→ : Given the challenge sequence γ , the challenged user identity ID and the outsourced data O ID , the cloud computes the integrity proof satisfying g( , ϑ; pk) = 0. VOLUME 7, 2019
• ProofCheck(γ , ; sk ID , pk)→ ζ : Given the challenge sequence γ and the data possession proof , the TPA checks whether g( , ϑ; pk) = 0 holds in order to judge the integrity of cloud storage. Note that: 1) ID-DIA-G can be extended to support data dynamics using the standard techniques, such as merkle hash tree [13] and index vectors [9] , [14] , [28] . 2) All ID-DIA-RLWE protocols in this paper follow the abstract framework ID-DIA-G.
C. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF ID-DIA-G
The correctness of ID-DIA-G can be guaranteed by the appropriate choice of f (·) and g(·). Thus, this subsection focuses mainly on the security guarantee and privacy protection of ID-DIA-G.
1) SECURITY GUARANTEE
According to Definition 5, the security proof of ID-DIA-G also consists of two steps. The first is to prove Pr[SG.Output = 1] = negl(λ); the second is to tackle
We start the proof from the simplest auditing case. Specifically, the challenge sequence is supposed to be γ = {i, κ, ID}, i.e., the TPA only audits a single packet. The cloud proof is supposed to be i . Then, the cloud can obtain the checking equations as follows:
where i = 1, 2, . . . , L. If the number of unknown variables in ϑ and sk ID is more than one, these two parameters will be unsolvable using (6) . Note that ϑ is no longer needed in the case that solving sk ID in (6) can be reduced to a hard assumption. Thus, there must be some variables in ϑ and sk ID that are almost unsolvable using (6) . The same observation also holds for the case of auditing multiple packets, since its checking equation on the cloud is just the linear combination of (6) . Thereafter, with the appropriate design of ϑ and sk ID , the cloud can hardly forge valid proofs to cheat the TPA successfully, i.e., Pr[SG. 
VII. CONCRETE INSTANTIATION USING ID-DIA-G
The cloud proofs in both ID-DIA-RLWE-1 and ID-DIA-RLWE-2 consist of n × 1 vectors, which lead to high communication and computation costs. To address this problem, this section provides a new ID-DIA-RLWE protocol through instantiating ID-DIA-G, which is denoted as ID-DIA-RLWE-3. We first introduce a theorem as follows. 
where c i is a random integer, d i ∈ R n q , w ∈ R q , and t i = wd i + e i . In addition, e i is computed using RLWESampePre(B, T ID , H 2 (i), s), and then Be i = H 2 (i).
Proof:
The proof is completed.
According to Theorem 12, the abstract parameters in ID-DIA-G can be instantiated as follows: f (·) = wd i + e i , system parameters (n, q), sk ID According to the framework of ID-DIA-G, it can be observed that the cloud can hardly compute the valid proofs using the outsourced data, and the TPA can also hardly solve user data from cloud proofs, which satisfies the security requirements in Definition 5 and 6. Based on the above discussion, ID-DIA-RLWE-3 is presented as follows: • Setup(λ) → (msk, pk): Given the security parameter λ, the KGC determines two integers k and q. The KGC computes
The KGC also generates a secure hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z 1×n n . Thus, the public parameters are (k, q, g) and the master secret key is msk = (T A , H ).
The client masks its outsourced data by computing d i = r i d i , where r i = H 1 (i) and H 1 : {0, 1} * → R q . The client determines a random number a ID ∈ R q and then computes B = a ID , 1, 
. . , t L ; ID), its secret value H 1 and its public key B. U ID publishes w and H 2 to the TPA through secure transmission channels.
• Challenge(λ, ID) → γ : This algorithm is the same as ID-DIA-RLWE-1.Challenge.
The proposed ID-DIA-RLWE-3 also achieves correctness, security and privacy guarantee. For detailed information, please refer to the theoretical analysis of its abstract protocol ID-DIA-G in Section VI-C.
VIII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first take the simplest ID-DIA-RLWE-3 as an example to illustrate how to evaluate the performance of ID-DIA protocols from the computation, storage and communication costs. Then, we provide the performance comparison and experimental results of all lattice-based ID-DIA protocols in this paper.
Let |D| denote the size of user original data, and K denote the number of cloud users. In addition, T tg l , T sp l , T bd l , T tg r , T sp r and T bd r represent the computation cost of LWETrapGen, LWESamplePre, LWEBasisDel, RLWETrapGen, RLWESamplePre and RLWEBasisDel, respectively. For convenience, we concentrate on the highest order of the cost, which is the most representative.
A. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 1) COMPUTATION COST
The KGC requires (T tg r + KT bd r ) time cost to setup the system parameters and distribute user secret keys. A cloud user needs (nλ 2 + T sp r )L time cost to calculate user tags. The cloud requires nηλ 2 computation cost to generate an integrity proof. The TPA needs ηλ 2 computation cost to verify the data integrity.
2) STORAGE COST
Both the KGC and the client need to store some parameters in R k q , which need nλ storage cost. The TPA needs to store the parameters (r, H 1 ) from different users, and thus its storage cost is K λ. The cloud stores all users' data packets and tags, whose storage cost is roughly 2K |D|.
3) COMMUNICATION COST
The communication cost can be divided into two parts: off-line and on-line ones. The former is mainly determinated by the transmission of all users' outsourced data, which is about 2K |D|. The later is mainly generated by the transmission of challenge sequences and cloud proofs, which is roughly ηλ for each data audit.
B. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
The performance comparison of different lattice-based ID-DIA protocols is shown in Table 1 . We can find that Liu et al. [27] based on LWE has the largest workloads due to the low efficiency of LWE. The proposed ID-DIA-RLWE-1 utilizes RLWE instead of LWE to enhance Liu et al. [27] protocol, which results in a moderate performance improvement. We can also observe that the proposed ID-DIA-RLWE-2 outperforms ID-DIA-RLWE-1. The reason is as follows. To protect the data privacy from the TPA, ID-DIA-RLWE-2 resorts to a secret vector instead of RLWETrapGen algorithm adopted in VOLUME 7, 2019 ID-DIA-RLWE-1, which can effectively eliminate the workloads from RLWETrapGen. At last, we can notice that the proposed ID-DIA-RLWE-3 has the lowest workloads in the respects of computation, communication and storage costs. This is because that ID-DIA-RLWE-3 only utilizes a secret number to achieve privacy guarantee against the TPA, which further enhances the efficiency of ID-DIA-RLWE-2.
C. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This subsection provides the experimental results of different lattice-based ID-DIA protocols, including storage, communication and computation costs. Our experiments are implemented using JAVA 1.8. The KGC, the TPA, the cloud and its client are deployed on four different computers with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7200U CPU and 8-GB RAM. The outsourced user data ''simplewiki-latest-imagelinks.sql.qz'' is chosen from [34] , whose size is 4.54 MB. The security parameter is λ = 512, the data packet length is n = 256, the challenged user number is K = 1, and the challenged length is η = 10. In addition, we focus mainly on online costs, which directly determine the performance of ID-DIA protocols. The experimental results are summarized in Table 2 , which further validate that our proposed ID-DIA-RLWE-3 has the superiority over the other protocols. 
IX. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes three ID-DIA protocols based on RLWE, which are denoted as ID-DIA-RLWE-1, ID-DIA-RLWE-2 and ID-DIA-RLWE-3, respectively. These three protocols are designed based on three different ways. The first is to improve the LWE-based ID-DIA protocols, which is implemented by replacing LWE with RLWE in the design of ID-DIA protocols. The second is to enhance the RLWE-based DIA protocols, which is achieved by utilizing KGC to distribute user secret keys. The third is to instantiate the proposed semantic ID-DIA-RLWE protocol, which further improves the efficiency of ID-based data auditing. We also propose a new security model of ID-DIA protocols, including correctness assurance, security guarantee and privacy protection. Then, we provide the theoretical analysis of all proposed ID-DIA-RLWE protocols in the given security model. Finally, we conduct the performance evaluation and comparison of all lattice-based ID-DIA-RLWE protocols in this paper. We can find that ID-DIA-RLWE-3 has the superiority over other protocols because of its simplest construction.
